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WHITE-COLLAR CRIME INVESTIGATIONS THROUGH INTERPOL:SYSTEMIC RISKS, POLITICAL ABUSE, AND THE NEED FOR REFORM

Updated: Aug 6

It has become clear that some regimes have become increasingly creative in their efforts to accuse of white-collar crimes and employ INTERPOL to persecute and harass their political opponents or simply those who dare disagree with their regimes. What happens when international policing tools like INTERPOL intended to protect human rights are instead weaponized to suppress them? How to avoid the risk sliding the INTERPOL's value to a mere mirror of national injustices rather than a leading, safeguarding international rights position?


At the beginning, I would like to reiterate the axiom - It must always be borne in minds that INTERPOL Red Notice is nothing more, but mere advertisment of the national arrest warrant re-designed visually into INTERPOL's design. Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant (!!!).

 

Look at the interpretation by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - one of the largest U.S. Federal appellate courts: "Since a Red Notice is not independently vetted for factual and legal justification, its reliability corresponds with that of the foreign nation's arrest warrant.” See Villalobos Sura v. Garland, No. 20-71839, 2021 WL 3627251 (2021).

 

So, the reliability of each Red Notice depends crucially on the independence of the social institutions inside the country requested to advertise their arrest warrant. Therefore, no one should attribute to an INTERPOL Red Notice solely any credibility higher than the existing level of credibility of the judicial and governmental system in the country requesting the advertisement of their national arrest warrant under a Red Notice.


Thus, if you see that Chinese or Russian or Iranian person is wanted by INTERPOL - it is not accurate. It simply means that the China, Russia, or Iran just has posted their national arrest warrants on the INTERPOL online platform - nothing more, nothing less. The INTERPOL listing carries no greater and no lesser credibility than the national warrants issued by those countries’ own judicial systems.



INTERPOL REFORM FOR WHITE-COLLAR CRIME INVESTIGATIONS


I’ve developed a policy proposal that addresses systemic abuse in INTERPOL’s handling of white-collar crime - where fabricated charges and politically motivated prosecutions can turn victims into fugitives but persecutors into ostensible victims. These abuses don’t just harm individuals - they erode the credibility of international institutions like INTERPOL and turns this organization into mere puppet in the hands of corruption authorities.


My framework proposes:


(1) Differentiated standards of review not for processing the data based on prosecution vs. post-conviction status


(2) Higher evidentiary thresholds in non-violent economic cases


(3) A public credibility rating system for member countries to prevent recurring misuse


(4) Stronger procedural safeguards grounded in neutrality before data is processed


(5) A formal citation and precedent system for INTERPOL’s own Repository of Practice


This proposal aims to strike the right balance between global cooperation and human rights protection - and to restore trust in INTERPOL’s role as a neutral, rule-based institution.


PROPOSAL FOR REFORMS


1. OVERVIEW:

This paper proposes a principled and pragmatic framework for reforming how INTERPOL handles white-collar crime data processing. The proposal:


Respects international human rights law, including the presumption of innocence, freedom of movement, and the right to seek asylum as outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

 

Differentiates between legal statuses, advocating higher protection for those merely accused or convicted in absentia, while establishing fair standards for post-conviction cases, burden of proof application;

 

Introduces realistic, tiered standards of proof (clear and convincing vs. preponderance), grounded in U.S. due process jurisprudence;

 

Responds to the systemic misuse of INTERPOL mechanisms by states;

 

Proposes actionable recommendations, including the use of Silver Notices for assets, the exclusion of business-to-business domestic disputes, and safeguards against politically motivated misuse.

 

This framework reflects a rights-based, legally coherent structure that balances the interests of international law enforcement with individual protections. It seeks to reinforce INTERPOL’s neutrality, credibility, and integrity in its commitment to its Constitution and UDHR.


2. INTRODUCTION


White-collar crime, typically involving financial fraud, embezzlement, tax evasion, and related offenses, occupies a complex space within international law enforcement. While such crimes can be serious, their inherently non-violent nature and more than frequent entanglement with political and commercial rivalries make them especially vulnerable to misuse.

INTERPOL, the world’s largest international police organization, has long struggled to maintain neutrality while assisting member states in investigating economic crimes. Unfortunately, systemic flaws in INTERPOL’s processing of Red Notices and diffusions have, in many cases, enabled corrupt or authoritarian regimes to target political opponents, business rivals, and whistleblowers under the pretense of white-collar charges. This paper explores these systemic vulnerabilities and calls for a principled reform grounded in the rule of law, presumption of innocence, and stricter standards for international cooperation.


3. INTERPOL’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRINCIPLES


INTERPOL operates under a constitution and a binding set of rules known as the Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD). Article 2 of the Constitution obliges INTERPOL to operate in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 3 explicitly prohibits the organization from engaging in matters of political, military, religious, or racial character.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 11 - guarantees the presumption of innocence, Article 13 – guarantees freedom of movement, and Article 14 – guarantees the right to seek and enjoy asylum.

The RPD reinforces these principles by requiring that all data be processed lawfully, fairly, and accurately. Individuals must be presumed innocent until proven guilty. These safeguards are intended to prevent abuse, but the decentralized nature of INTERPOL’s structure, and its reliance on National Central Bureaus (NCBs) in member states, often leaves room for manipulation.

Article 83(1)(a)(i) of the RPD requires that the wanted person has committed “a serious ordinary-law crime” and specifically prohibits the publication of Red Notices for offenses “originating from a violation of laws or regulations of an administrative nature or deriving from private disputes, unless the criminal activity is aimed at facilitating a serious crime or is suspected of being connected to organized crime.”

Pursuant to Articles 35 of the RPD, any data recorded in INTERPOL’s files must be “of interest for the purposes of international police cooperation.”


4. POLITICAL ABUSE IN WHITE-COLLAR CRIME INVESTIGATIONS


Unlike violent crimes or terrorism, white-collar offenses are often difficult to separate from political or economic contexts. A common pattern involves a government, especially in countries with compromised judiciaries, or countries, in which charges of fraud or embezzlement against exiled businesspeople, dissidents, or civil society figures may be issued without judicial scrutiny but by the decision of one investigator. These charges are then used to request Red Notices through INTERPOL, weaponizing international cooperation to silence or detain political opponents.

Numerous human rights organizations and legal scholars have criticized this abuse. Reports from such organizations have documented dozens of such cases. These abuses not only harm the individuals involved but also severely undermine INTERPOL’s credibility and legitimacy, making INTERPOL inadvertently an instrument that facilitates corrupt practices, thereby undermining its role as a neutral and principled global law enforcement organization.

Even more problematic is the use of diffusions, a lesser known but equally powerful instrument, which allows NCBs to bypass standard review and circulate alerts directly to member states without centralized oversight. Given the speed, secrecy, and lack of scrutiny associated with diffusions, they are especially prone to abuse in politically sensitive white-collar cases. Therefore, the use of diffusions must be strictly prohibited in relation to economic crimes where due process and political neutrality are not fully verifiable. Allowing diffusions in such cases risks undermining all procedural safeguards, INTERPOL commitment to its constitution and opens the door to immediate international repercussions based on unchecked claims.

Furthermore, with INTERPOL’s recent development of the Silver Notice, which enables the identification and suspension of access to alleged criminal assets, it is even more appropriate that in economic crimes involving suspected unlawful enrichment, actions be targeted at property and financial assets, rather than at individuals. This approach minimizes the risk of personal harm and respects the presumption of innocence while still preserving the possibility of eventual restitution.


5. WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REQUIRES A DISTINCT STANDARD


Financial crimes do not present the same immediate danger to public safety as violent offenses. Instead, they often involve alleged economic misconduct, regulatory breaches, or commercial rivalries, which may or may not amount to serious criminal activity or interest for the purposes of international police cooperation depending on legal context and jurisdiction. Their complexity, dependence on document-based evidence, and intersection with political and business interests make them uniquely vulnerable to abuse.

INTERPOL must therefore develop a distinct and rights-based evidentiary and procedural framework for handling such cases. This includes:


Prohibiting the processing of cases where individuals are merely sought for prosecution or convicted in absentia unless clear and convincing evidence is provided by the requesting NCB to demonstrate both the legality and legitimacy of the charges;

 

Permitting notices for individuals sought to serve a sentence only where there is no preponderance of evidence indicating that the conviction was politically motivated or in violation of Articles 2 or 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution;

 

Recognizing that not all crimes under domestic law pose an international danger or interest for the purposes of international police cooperation under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.


Furthermore, requests rooted in business-to-business domestic relationships must be categorically rejected. Regardless of their seriousness, commercial disputes are civil matters and must be adjudicated in national or international civil forums – not through the mechanisms of international policing. When INTERPOL processes such cases, it inadvertently becomes a facilitator of corrupt private interests, undermining its global neutrality and credibility.


The notorious case of William Browder and his lawyer Sergei Magnitsky—who was killed in Russian custody—demonstrates how easily victims of corruption and whistleblowers can be reframed as ostensible criminals. Ensuring fairness in commercial domestic relationships is the responsibility of domestic regulatory and judicial systems, not INTERPOL. Without clear boundaries, INTERPOL risks becoming a tool for advancing politically or commercially motivated retaliation, rather than a neutral enforcer of global justice.


6. IMPLICATIONS FOR FAIR TRIALS AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY


When INTERPOL disseminates Red Notices based on politically motivated or flawed prosecutions, it becomes complicit in violating fair trial rights under international law. Many of the targeted individuals are asylum seekers, exiled politicians, or former officials. Their detention in third countries often leads to prolonged imprisonment, deprivation of the right to seek asylum, legal limbo, or forced repatriation to face sham trials.


This undermines not only their human rights but the broader effort to hold corrupt governments accountable. Instead of deterring corruption, INTERPOL in these cases reinforces impunity by legitimizing corrupt prosecutions.


7. THE REPOSITORY OF PRACTICE ON ARTICLES 2 AND 3


INTERPOL's recently updated Repository of Practice on the Application of Articles 2 and 3 acknowledges the problem of politically motivated requests, especially in white-collar crime. However, the document remains general in nature and lacks enforceable mechanisms. It serves as useful guidance but must be promulgated into binding policy reform.


To strengthen its authority and ensure consistent application, INTERPOL should elevate the Repository into a formally recognized and regularly applied body of internal practice. The organization should establish a regulatory framework for CCF and RPD that treats prior determinations and interpretive guidance in the Repository as persuasive authority in future evaluations.


In addition, INTERPOL should develop a structured system of case recognition and referencing that allows the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF) and other decision-makers to cite prior relevant cases with clarity. This system would:


Increase consistency in evaluating politically sensitive requests;


Enable NCBs, individuals, and legal representatives to reference relevant determinations;

 

Improve transparency, predictability, and procedural fairness in case handling;

 

Deter repetitive abuse by exposing patterns of politically motivated misuse by certain jurisdictions.


Such a system would transform the Repository from a general advisory guide into a functional tool for legal coherence, fairness, and accountability. It would facilitate more structured decision-making and signal INTERPOL’s commitment to principled, rule-based operations across its member states.


Proposed context for CCF Statute:


Consideration of Repository and Related Evidence

The Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF) shall consider all relevant evidence, including submissions from parties, verified factual reports, and interpretive materials issued by INTERPOL, including the Repository of Practice and prior case determinations. Repository content and precedent may serve as persuasive authority and should be cited and applied consistently unless a reasoned distinction is provided.


8. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM


A reform agenda should be grounded in the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), particularly the presumption of innocence (Article 11), freedom of movement (Article 13), and the right to seek and enjoy asylum (Article 14). INTERPOL’s cooperation with member states must evidently reflect these global standards, especially in white-collar crime cases where the high risk of national criminal charges conflict with human rights obligations.


Not all individuals sought by national authorities for financial crimes pose an international threat. INTERPOL must recognize that criminal allegations under domestic law do not necessarily equate to an internationally recognized danger or amount to interest for the purposes of international police cooperation.


Two categories of individuals should be considered under different standards of proof and bear the burden of proof differently:


  1. Individuals sought “for prosecution” or convicted in absentia: These individuals must be presumed innocent. INTERPOL must not allow arrest alerts unless the National Central Bureau (NCB) provides clear and convincing evidence of the individual’s criminal culpability. Arrest warrants or charging documents or other conclusive documents alone are insufficient; factual and procedural support and fairness must be demonstrated. These individuals shall not be processed by INTERPOL unless this evidentiary threshold is met. In simple words – the data for these people shall not be processed until NCB establishes its burden of proof under clear and convincing standard of proof of the individual’s criminal culpability

  

  1. In contrast, for individuals sought “for serving a conviction” but obtained not in absentia, the burden should shift: such individuals cannot fully benefit from the presumption of innocence, and therefore, must themselves carry out the burden of proof to demonstrate – under the standard of proof – preponderance of evidence – that the conviction was politically motivated or otherwise in conflict with the provisions of RPD, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or Articles 2 or 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution.


This differentiation reflects the U.S. constitutional standard for pretrial detention, which balances liberty interests with public risk. As in U.S. jurisprudence, the burden of proof must correspond to the magnitude of the harm at stake. As explained in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), when the risk of unjust deprivation of liberty is high, a clear and convincing evidence standard is warranted for the government to prove that the restriction of liberty is necessary.


INTERPOL must therefore adopt a multi-tiered framework for evaluating Red Notices and diffusions:


Special Review Process for White-Collar Crime Notices:

Establish a dedicated panel within the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF) to independently assess economic crime cases before the data is processed.


To further safeguard against systemic abuse, INTERPOL should establish a public credibility rating for each member country. This rating would be calculated automatically using objective indicators, such as:


  • The total number of requests submitted by the member country;

  • The percentage of notices or diffusions subsequently deleted, canceled, or deemed non-compliant;

  • The frequency of submissions lacking supporting documentation;

  • The rate of findings involving politically motivated misuse or violations of INTERPOL’s Constitution.

 

The resulting credibility score should directly influence the level of scrutiny applied to future requests. A low score would trigger enhanced review procedures, while a consistently high score could justify expedited consideration.

This rating mechanism would promote transparency, deter repeated misuse, and incentivize member countries to uphold the legal and ethical standards that underpin international police cooperation.


Ban on Diffusions in Economic Crime Cases: Prohibit the use of diffusions for white-collar offenses unless they meet the same standards as Red Notices and are subject to independent scrutiny.


Asset-Focused Measures via Silver Notice: Prioritize financial and property-based restrictions in cases of alleged financial misconduct rather than international arrest.


Exclusion of Commercial Disputes: Automatically reject requests rooted in domestic business-to-business conflicts as civil matters, not suitable for international policing.


Regular NCB Audits and Accountability: Monitor and sanction NCBs with repeated misuse of the INTERPOL system.


Transparency and Redress: Expand rights for individuals to challenge Red Notices and require public disclosure of canceled or rejected alerts.


9. CONCLUSION


INTERPOL stands at a crossroads. To remain a credible force in international law enforcement, it must resist becoming a tool for authoritarian abuse. White-collar crimes, due to their complexity and susceptibility to political misuse, demand special caution. By adopting higher standards of proof, enhancing procedural safeguards, and reaffirming its commitment to neutrality, INTERPOL can protect both its reputation and the rights of those it serves to monitor. Failing to do so risks reducing the organization to a mere mirror of national injustices rather than a safeguard against them.


Most importantly, the principle of neutrality must be firmly established prior to the processing of any data – not merely evaluated after a person has already been entered into INTERPOL’s systems. Upholding neutrality at the entry stage is essential to prevent reputational harm, legal injury, and improper detention resulting from politically or commercially motivated misuse.

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